I. Introduction
The purpose of exercising a part of its power" (Atkins v. Kansas (1903) ). Therefore, any authority that local governments possess must come from grants by the state, either in the state constitution, state enabling authority or charters.
Although the extent and effect of local government autonomy has formed a source of debate and discussion for many decades, and produced a great deal of literature, few efforts attempt to measure local government autonomy. Writers either "trivialize" local government autonomy by focusing on choice-oriented, efficiency theory or ignore the concept in favor of a focus on local government processes (Clark 1984) . Likewise, the information available on local government autonomy confines itself to the narrow range of function, finances and personnel administration (Krane 2001 ).
Relatively few scholars know much about the constitutional, political, and fiscal ties that bind states and localities, and even fewer have much information about the complex interactions between the state and local governments engaged in the delivery of public goods and services. Research continues to suffer from this blind spot on state-local relations and, of course, so does the teaching of subnational politics. (Hanson 1998, 3) .
Many efforts to define local government autonomy use Dillon's Rule and home rule as the beginning metrics (Weeks and Hardy (1984) ; Krane, Rigos and Hill (2001) ; Geon and Turnbull (2004) ). However, other commentators reject the use of Dillon's Rule and home rule labels as a proxy measure of local government autonomy (Richardson, et al., 2003; Bluestein, 2006) . This paper shows that conflating the use of Dillon's Rule or home rule with local government autonomy critically errs in the attempt to capture the true measure of local government autonomy. In addition, the terms Dillon's Rule and home rule represent completely different concepts and are not capable of comparison.
The first part of the paper briefly describes Dillon's Rule. In addition, the use and misuse of Dillon's Rule in describing local government autonomy is discussed. The paper then outlines the various depictions of home rule is then discussed. The author then characterizes local government autonomy and describes the link, or lack thereof, between local government autonomy, Dillon's Rule and home rule. The paper concludes that Dillon's Rule and home rule form two completely different concepts that cannot be used to attempt to rank or describe levels of local government autonomy. (Richardson, et al. 2003) .
owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from, the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. If it may destroy, it may abridge and control…We know of no limitation on this right so far as the corporations themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature." "It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers and no others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation, not simply convenient, but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable doubt concerning the existence of the power is resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the power is denied."
The rule clearly recognizes the state legislature as the sovereign power and the local government as subordinate (Richardson, et al. 2003) . In 1873, Judge Dillon included this rule in his seminal treatise, Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations. It was at this time that most state and federal courts adopted the rule. Richardson, Gough and Puentes (2003) found that 39 states have adopted Dillon's Rule as the rule of statutory construction to interpret grants of authority to local governments.
As shown in Appendix A, only 9 states, Alaska, Iowa, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina and Utah reject the use of Dillon's Rule. Thirtyone states use the rule for all types of localities, while eight (Alabama, California, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana and Tennessee) use the rule for certain types of localities, but not others (Richardson, et al. 2003) .
The United States Supreme Court twice upheld Dillon's Rule against attacks on its constitutionality (Atkins v. Kansas (1903) ; City of Trenton v. New Jersey (1923) ). In the Atkins case, the Court opined that: "[local governments] are the creatures, mere political subdivisions of the state for the purpose of exercising a part of its powers. They may exert only such powers as are expressly granted to them, or such as may be necessarily implied from those granted. What they lawfully do of a public character is done under the sanction of the state. They may be created, or, having been created, their powers may be restricted or enlarged, or altogether withdrawn at the will of the legislature; the authority of the legislature, when restricting or withdrawing such powers, being subject only to the fundamental condition that the collective and individual rights of the municipality shall not be destroyed."
The United States Supreme Court also commented on the power of local governments in Community Communication Co. v. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982) In effect, Dillon's Rule merely reflects settled legal principles derived, in part, from the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Richardson, et al. 2003) .
Local governments exist only as creatures, delegates and agents of the state (Briffault, 1990 ) and states exercise complete hegemony over local governments (Briffault, 1990 ). Although the rule is "strict" when compared to the "liberal" construction of statutes, the language of Dillon's Rule suggests moderation. For example, Csoka (2007) asserts that Nevada courts, on occasion, seem to have relaxed the strict construction required by Dillon's Rule, even while purporting to apply the rule, creating a "sensible construction" or "reasonable construction" standard.
While a strict construction should be applied to the grant of powers to municipalities…, yet if the power is clearly implied, it should not be impaired by a strict construction. A strict construction must yet be a sensible construction and be based upon the entire context. Or, as it is sometimes put, the power given by the charter is a matter of reasonable construction. Vegas, 65 P.2d 133 (Nev. 1937) , cited in Csoka (2007, 206) . The court's language, as well as Csoka's arguments, seems to mirror USACIR's assertion that the history of Dillon's Rule dictates that the rule should not be interpreted as a rule of strict statutory construction (USACIR, October 1993). USACIR's research supports a view of the rule as calling for a "fair and reasonable" construction of grants of power to local governments (Ibid). However, since all rules of statutory construction seek to fairly construe the legislature's intent, the distinction seems of little consequence.
Ronnow v. City of Las

C.
Dillon's Rule Portrayed as the Determinant of Local Government Authority Albuquerque (1998) describes Dillon's Rule as a "yoke" under which local governments must "struggle". One particularly strident critique of Dillon's Rule portrays the rule as a "strait-jacket" to local governments (Gere, 1982) . Similarly, the doctrine has been described as "rigid and inflexible" (Ibid). The doctrine effects "a widespread impact upon the American community and urban landscape and has permanently colored the nature of state-local relations in each of the fifty states" (Gere, 1982) . Gere (1982) further describes the principle as "so overwhelmingly weighted in favor of supreme state authority and control that hundreds of cities, towns, villages and other local communities in the United States have never known another way of life" (Gere, 1982) .
Csoka ( growth in a more aggressive manner is guided by the so-called Dillon Rule" (Owens and Sarte, (33) (34) . Hence, the toolkit to control growth is necessarily limited (Ibid, 34). The authors make no effort to even attempt to support these assertions. Mikesell and Mullins (2007) use the typology developed by Richardson, et al. (2003) in their model of household property tax burdens. (Turnbull and Geon 2006, 489) . Turnbull and Geon (2006) hypothesize as to the impacts of home rule and Dillon's Rule. Home rule gives governments more power than Dillon's Rule to respond to voter preferences and "more closely matches the marginal cost of public goods provided and marginal benefits from local public services" (Turnbull and Geon 2006, 489-490) .
However, "home rule can push the equilibrium away from the median voter hypothesis when intergovernmental competition is not strong enough to offset the local government tendency to pursue its own expansionary objectives. Under Brennan and Buchanan's (1980) leviathan hypothesis, Dillon's rule is precisely the type of external constraint needed to harness the expansionary proclivities of local government. The leviathan hypothesis maintains that the local government is less likely to satisfy the median voter hypothesis under the unrestricted home rule than under the restrictive Dillon's rule" (Turnbull and Geon 2006, 490) . This operationalization of local government autonomy again fails to appreciate the subtleties of Dillon's Rule and home rule, instead oversimplying the concepts as polar opposites.
III. Home Rule
Home rule proves to be much more difficult to define than Dillon's Rule.
" [T] here is perhaps no term in the literature of political science or law that is susceptible to misconception and variety of meaning than 'home rule'" (Chicago Home Rule Commission 1954). Confusion arises, in part, from the use of the term as a political motto and a legal doctrine (Sandalow 1964). In addition, "the term 'home rule' has acquired an almost talismanic aura over the years and often, inaccurately, connotes almost total freedom of local government from state control" (Richardson, et al. 2003, 7) .
In practice, however, home rule rarely provides substantial autonomy and freedom from state interference (Bluestein 2006 (Bluestein , 2003 .
One type of home rule provides the inverse of Dillon's Rule, stating that courts will interpret grants of authority from the state to local governments liberally. Using this rule, a court would resolve any doubts with respect to the existence of the power in favor of the local governments and assume the authority exists. Some refer to this type of home rule as "legislative home rule" (Mead 1987; Krane, Rigos, and Hill 2001) .
Most fundamentally, home rule refers to a state constitutional provision or legislative action that provides a local government with a greater measure of selfgovernment ability (Black 1990 ). Used in this way, home rule involves two components:
(1) the power of local governments to manage "local" affairs; and, (2) the ability of local government to avoid interference from the state (Timmons 1993) . This definition makes home rule synonymous with local government autonomy, as detailed in section IV, below.
Theorists have classified types of home rule in at least 4 different ways (Richardson, et al. 2003) . The first uses the way the grant operates, or operational categorization. Operational home rule may occur in two different ways. First the state may grant authority to local governments to act in certain areas with legislative authority.
Secondly, the state may be limited in regulating certain municipal affairs (Welch 1999) .
Structural categorization classifies home rule according to the structure of the grant (Mead 1997; Krane, Rigos, and Hill 2001) . One type of structural home rule attempts to carve out an area of exclusive local concern where local governments have the exclusive right to regulate. The second merely transposes Dillon's Rule, as described above (Richardson, et al. 2003) .
Some classify home rule based on the source of the authority (Welch 1999) . If the source is found in the state constitution, then the doctrine is referred to as constitutional home rule. Legislative home rule derives from grants from the state legislature (Richardson, et al. 2003) .
Finally, Richardson, Gough and Puentes (2003) suggest a fourth classification method. Under this classification system, grants of authority would be categorized based upon whether the grant addresses local government autonomy or the judicial interpretation of state grants of authority to local governments (Richardson, et al. 2003) .
Regardless of the classification system, no type of home rule equates to total freedom for local governments from state oversight (Richardson, et al. 2003 
B. Local Government Autonomy Defined
Perhaps the most complete definition of local government autonomy comes from Clark (1984) . Clark defines local autonomy in terms of two levels. Level one includes autonomy received through constitutions, rules, standards, and mandates. Level two refers to autonomy received through implementation and political interpretation of the social institutions. Conflict abounds at the second level, surrounding the issues of application and adjudication of rules.
More importantly, Clark draws upon Bentham's (1970) theory of legal powers
and provides a more expansive description of Timmons' (1993) definition of home rule to define local government autonomy based upon the two principles of power: immunity and initiative (Clark 1984) . Autonomy refers to the degree to which the government holds the power to act on matters under its own preferences in accordance to the standards set forth by the state.
Initiative refers to the power of localities to regulate the behavior of residents in the local government's own interest/preference (the first portion of the definition).
Immunity involves the power of localities to operate without oversight from the state.
The state may limit autonomy by withholding the grant of the authority or through lack of immunity.
Total initiative involves those instances where a local government holds all possible authority to act as it wishes. Total immunity refers to a situation whereby the local government may act without review or authority from the state.
Total immunity likely fails to exist, except perhaps for some narrow range of powers. Likewise, one rarely, if ever, finds absolute discretion in practice unless a particular power or area is examined.
For example, if a state statute clearly authorizes local governments in a particular state to create transfer of development rights (TDR) programs, with total discretion to dictate the terms and parameters of the program, one may say that initiative exists.
Presumably, the technical skills and fiscal resources necessary to create and carry out the program must exist for true initiative to be present. If the state reserves no oversight authority over local TDR programs, then the local government can be said to possess immunity.
Clark delineates four types of autonomy in terms of the two principles of power:
• Type 1: initiative and immunity (total/absolute autonomy)
• Type 2: initiative and no immunity The local government holds complete discretion over how to act. Type 2 power allows the local government to make its own decisions in terms of rules and regulations.
However, the lack of immunity means that the state and/or federal government hold oversight authority. All actions are subject to review, modifications or negation. In another study, Geon and Turnbull (2004) likewise make the mistake of conflating "local government autonomy" with varying degrees of "Home Rule" and "Dillon's
Rule". The Geon and Turnbull (2004) study attempts to measure local government autonomy by using the labels of "strong Home Rule" (a large degree of local autonomy), "weak Home Rule", "weak Dillon's Rule" and "strong Dillon's Rule" (little or no local autonomy) (Ibid). Krane, Rigos and Hill (2001) provided the basis for this state-by-state classification. The Geon and Turnbull measure appears to look only at initiative, and not immunity.
The Clark (1984) , Weeks and Hardy (1984) , and Geon and Turnbull (2004) classification systems all also suffer the limitation of attempting to place local government autonomy within one of only a handful of categories. These classification systems fail to reflect the reality of the extent of local government autonomy as falling along a continuum that lacks bright-line boundaries. In actuality, local government autonomy defies compartmentalization of this type. In addition, autonomy may vary Finally, and related to the attempt to limit the number of categories, each of these systems works best when attempting to describe a particular power, like the power to create and administer a TDR program. When these classification systems are applied to local governments generally, the categories ultimately fail since local governments hold broad authority in some areas, and little in others.
The author rejects the Weeks and Hardy (1984) and Geon and Turnbull (2004) classifications. Due to a misinterpretation of Dillon's Rule and home rule, both systems focus on the manner in which autonomy is granted to the local government, as opposed to the extent of autonomy actually held by the local government.
For example, a "strong Dillon's Rule state" may grant local governments broad autonomy (Richardson, Gough and Puentes 2003) . Similarly, in the Weeks and Hardy 
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however, raises an important issue with respect to local government autonomy. Of course, if local governments lack sufficient financial means to adopt and carry out enabled authority, the authority rings hollow (Briffault 1996) . The literature contains myriad examples of commentators bemoaning the lack of resources and the lack of an ability to raise money as presenting severe limitations to theoretical autonomy.
The author recognizes the very real obstacles that finances present to the implementation of local government autonomy. This paper fails to include finances in any meaningful way when classifying states as to local government autonomy. However, in describing a particular state, the author notes financial concerns as described in the literature. autonomy. This study ranks states on overall degree of local discretionary authority (USACIR, 1982) . The summary of the USACIR (1982) rankings are contained in Table   1 . Virginia, a state in which the authors argue the courts apply Dillon's Rule more stringently than any in the country, ranked 6 th amongst the states with the most local discretionary authority. Oregon local governments hold the most discretionary authority Wolman, et al. (2008) conducted an extensive study to compare local government autonomy across states. Local government autonomy was defined as "a system of local government in which local government units have an important role to play in the economy and the intergovernmental system, having discretion in determining what they will do without undue constraint from higher levels of government, and have the means or capacity to do so" (Wolman, et al. 2008) . This study created an index based upon three dimensions: local government importance, local government discretion and local government capacity (Ibid). The authors operationalized local government discretion, in part, through the use of the Krane, Rigos and Hill (2001) measure of structural home rule.
In addition, the Richardson, Gough and Puentes (2003) assignment of Dillon's Rule status was applied (Wolman, et al. 2008) . The study did not acknowledge the lack of link between the use of Dillon's Rule and local government autonomy. Csoka (2007) argues that grants of municipal structural and personnel powers should be construed liberally; municipal functional powers should be construed under a "reasonable construction" standard that considers custom; and grants of municipal fiscal powers should be strictly construed (214). In addition, emergency powers granted to local governments should be broadened (Ibid).
Liberal construction of structural and personnel powers allows the electorate freedom in deciding on the structure of government, lowers the risk of legal challenge to such powers and levels the playing field for local governments competing for employees in the marketplace (Csoka 2007) . The arguments that support Dillon's Rule do not apply for structural and personnel powers (Ibid).
Local governments assume a large number of functions in today's society. Strict construction of grants of those powers may lead to absurd results (Csoka 2007 ). Csoka (2007) analogizes municipalities to administrative agencies with respect to grants of functional authority. As such, these grants should be more liberally construed. However, Csoka (2007) stops short of recommending liberal construction, noting that these powers are exercised external to the locality, unlike structural and personnel powers. A "reasonable construction" standard balances these considerations (Ibid).
Finally, adherence to a strict construction standard should be maintained for grants of fiscal power (Csoka 2007) . Public policy dictates that local governments be strictly monitored in how revenue is generated (Ibid).
In contrast, Bluestein (2006) focuses on the grants of authority themselves as opposed to construing the grants. She makes three recommendations for reform to improve flexibility, efficiency and predictability in the delegation of authority from the state to local governments in North Carolina (Bluestein 2006) . At least two of the recommendations apply equally well to other states claiming inhabitation of local government autonomy due to the perceived constraints of Dillon's Rule.
(1) Reduce statutory detail. Through broadly wording enabling legislation, the legislature promotes local government flexibility in the implementation and administration of grants of authority (Bluestein 2006) .
(2) Clarify the standard of judicial review. Confusion exists in the state as to which grants of authority the broad construction set out in the statutes should apply (Richardson, et al. 2003; Bluestein 2006) . In addition, the courts have inconsistently applied the statute (Richardson, et al. 2003; Bluestein 2006) .
Clarifying these matters would increase predictability for local governments (Bluestein 2006) .
(3) Authorize local ordinances to conform city charters and county local acts to the general law. Practically, the state legislature should not have to intervene for this purpose (Bluestein 2006) .
Reducing statutory detail and authorizing local ordinances to conform city charters and county local acts to general law would reduce the burden of the courts in interpreting statutory grants of authority in any state. The Bluestein (2006) recommendations comport with the theory of Dillon's Rule advanced by Richardson, Gough and Puentes (2003) . Namely, if the state legislature clearly delegates authority to local governments, Dillon's Rule will not be invoked.
VII. Conclusions
Identifying a state as one where the judiciary uses or does not use Dillon's Rule lacks any predictive ability as to the amount of local government autonomy possessed by local governments within the state (Bluestein 2006) . This distinction also fails to provide insight as to the state's local government structure (Bluestein 2006) .The Dillon's Rule/home rule distinction provides a false dichotomy (Richardson, et al. 2003; Bluestein 2006 ). Dillon's Rule is a rule of statutory construction, while home rule generally refers to source and/or extent of delegation of authority from the state to the local governments (Bluestein 2006) . In essence, this type of analysis compares apples to oranges.
For example, Richardson, Gough and Puentes (2003) classified North Carolina as a state whose judiciary uses Dillon's Rule to construe grants of authority from the state legislature to local governments. However, North Carolina presents a unique case. The legislature has passed two statutes directing the courts to use a liberal construction of state delegations of power to local governments (Richardson, et al. 2003; Bluestein 2006 ). The state courts have been inconsistent with respect to strictly or liberally construing these delegations of authority (Richardson, et al. 2003; Bluestein 2006 ). Bluestein (2006) examined the breadth of authority held by local governments in North Carolina and compared this authority to the power of local governments in "home rule" states. The comparison yielded the conclusion that North Carolina local governments hold as much, and often more, authority than local governments in home rule states (Bluestein 2006) .
A more apt analysis to attempt to ascertain the impact of Dillon's Rule on local government autonomy would compare court decisions construing grants of authority using Dillon's Rule versus court decisions using a liberal construction standard. To date, no such analysis has occurred. Future research should explore this question.
In any case, the "talismanic aura" of home rule (Richardson, et al. 2003 ) almost certainly overstates the importance of local government autonomy.
[t]he virtues of enhancing local government autonomy tend to be greatly exaggerated. Localism reflects territorial economic and social inequalities and reinforces them with political power. Its benefits accrue primarily to minority of affluent localities, to the detriment of other communities and to the system of local government as a whole…Localist ideology and local political action tend not to build up public life, but rather contribute to the pervasive privatism that is the hallmark of contemporary American politics. Localism may be more of an obstacle to achieving social justice and the development of public life than a prescription for their attainment. (Briffault 1990, 1-2; cited in Bluestein 2006) . 
